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Abstract
Most of the intrusion detection sensors suffer from
the high rate offake alerts that the sensor produce. In
this paper, we propose a new approach based on fuzzy
cognitive maps (FCM) to reduce false alerts in SOM-
based intrusion detection sensors. Initially, each
neuron is mapped to its best matching unit in the self
organizing map and then updated by the fuzzy
cognitive map framework. This updating is achieved
through the weights of the neighboring neurons. Based
on the domain knowledge of network data (network
packets) the SOMIFCM combination presents
quantitative and qualitative matching correspondences
which in turn reduce the number of suspicious neurons
i.e. reduce the number of false alerts. This method
work as a unique fuz zy clustering approach and we
demonstrate its performance using DARPA 1999
network traffic data set.
Keywords- Intrusion detection, False alerts, Self
organizing maps, Fuzzy cognitive maps, Security
1. Introduction
In recent years, the dramatic threat of network-based
attacks and the security concerns have received higher
attention from different organizations for deploying
more sophisticated IDS sensors as first line of defense.
More over, there is a wide variety of techniques used in
intrusion detection research such that the use of
unsupervised learning algorithms and AI methods
which show impressing results and abilities yet to
discover in the field. A typical problem that arises
when deploying intrusion detection sensors is their
affinities of producing high rate of fake alerts, thus, it
need huge analysis efforts at higher levels.
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Among the vast variety of techniques which have
been researched for the IDS sensors, the interest on AI
techniques and data mining applications have received
greater attention particularly the use of unsupervised
leaning methods as they have the ability to address
some of the short comings [I]. This is also helps to
achieve the ultimate goal for the IDS i.e. the capability
of novelty detection. Recently, the unsupervised
learning method (SOM) has represented an excellent
performance for sensors work on an unsupervised
learning mode [2], as well as it is efficient for real-time
intrusion detection [3]. However, in order to refine the
process and achieve better detection and performance,
extra efforts are required.
In the context of this paper, we present a new
approach based on fuzzy cognitive maps to reduce false
alerts in SOM-based intrusion detection sensors.
Initially, each neuron is mapped to its best matching
unit in the self organizing map and then updated
through the weights of the neighboring neurons. Later,
the weights of odd neurons are considered based on its
relevance to the clusters and/or to the relevant error
caused by odd neurons. Based on the effect value of
odd neurons, benign concepts which are not relevant to
attacks or certain error caused are dropped. The
approach highlights fuzzy clustered neurons (in SOM)
in order to build a network of concepts where matching
constraints are mapped.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides a background of related work. In
Section 3 a details of SOMIFCM framework
components are presented. In section 4 and 5 we
present experimental results and discussion. Finally, in
section 6 we provide conclusion and future work.
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Figure I. SOM structure example
Wi (t +1) = Wi (t) + hci (t)[x(t) - Wi (t)]
3. Combined SOM-FCM Model: A New
Approach
Two-dimensional SOM
One-dimensional SOM
~'eUrnl-. nodeIy
Single neuron
SOM can reduce dimensions by producing a map of
usually one or two dimensions which plot the similarity
of the data by grouping similar data items together. A
wining neuron is one of neurons such that very similar
or close to the neighborhood data in which later on can
be classified as or belong to clusters. In this way the
SOM can provide specialized platform for data
representation from the input space. Figure I show
some examples.
Neurons can be organized in any topological
manner. In the case of SOM, neurons usually are
located on regular one or two dimensional topology.
The Kohonen's Maps so called self organizing maps
(SOM) [23] is a competitive and cooperative learning
neural network. Thus, SOM retains the quality of a
competitive and cooperative learning network to learn
from a data set without supervision.
A typical SOM structure is usually an array of
neurons arranged in rectangular or hexagonal method.
Each of the neurons on the map is represented by a set
of weights W = [WI ••Wn] where n is equal to the
dimension of the input vector. Two stages are required
in order to create the SOM are initialization and
training of the SOM. The initialization process sets up
the map with the desired dimensions and initial weights
for each unit of the map. The training process allows
the map to adapt to the features of the data set during a
number of epochs. At each epoch one input vector X is
compared to all neurons weights W with a distance
function (Euclidean or Manhattan) to identify the most
similar nodes so called the best matching unit (BMU).
Once the BMU has been found, the neighboring
neurons and the BMU itself are updated according to
the following rule:
False positive alerts have been addressed by various
studies at sensor level [6,7,8] by improving the sensor
outputs. These studies whether are too general or
concentrate on certain product improvement. On the
other hand, false alerts have been tackled at higher
levels of the IDS operations. One such prototype is the
Toolkit for Intrusion Alert Analysis [9], and the
Intrusion Alert quality Framework [10] that uses
certain quality parameters to improve the false
positives by 35.04% using DARPA 2000 data set. The
various techniques used include data mining [11], AI
techniques [12], fuzzy logic [13], neural networks [14]
and neuro-fuzzy approach [15]. These techniques and
approaches work on logs/alerts directly and indirectly
by building new strategies to tackle intrusions of
various types to improve the detection process.
2. Related Works
Our work was motivated by the work done recently
on SOM ensembles [4] and hierarchal SOM [2,5] for
intrusion detection. Ensemble SOM are able to
identify computer attacks and characterize them
appropriately with levels of confidence where as
Hieratical SOM provide an amazing detection rate and
false positive rate under test conditions. The SOM
method is attractive because of considering the
properties of events and its capability of processing
large amount of data with low computational overhead
i.e. suitable for real-time intrusion detection [3].
However, our work is different from these approaches
in tackling the internal properties of SOM i.e. retesting
the properties that are out of norm internally using the
FCM framework.
The potentials of unsupervised learning techniques
in anomaly detection can be demonstrated through the
use of the SOM and FCM as the basis for anomaly
detection is one of the main consideration in this paper.
Thus. it is important to exhibit how these methods can
support the current IDS specifically by building a
purely data driven inference engine able to provide
timely and accurately details and notifications of
activities going on the system network. The biggest
challenge here is to develop an intelligent inference
engine model to defense-in depth i.e. able to deal with
uncertainty and detect novel attacks with low rate of
false alerts. Moreover, any optimal solution of an
adaptive IDS system should provide the means of real-
time detection and response as well as high level trust
among the IDS components.
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Where t is an integer that denotes time, h
ci (t) is
the neighborhood function around the winner unit c
and x(t) is the input vector drawn at timet. By
updating the BMU and other units in the neighborhood,
the distance between the BMU and the neighbors are
brought clo ser together. The neighborhood function
consists of two parts, one that define the form of the
neighborhood and the other is the learning rate.
,..,
.... >-
•• 0~ Norma lI>-<
K>-
°0 ° • 0 Suspcctc
° I Attac k
To increase the correlation among the neurons in
the produced map grid, we minimize the neighborhood
function and the learning rate by considering the
minimum time interval according to the following rule
Where rc the location of winner unit , rj is the
location of the unit i on the grid map and oc (t) is the
learning rate factor over minimum time t interval.
Later, at this stage the map converge to an inactive
stage which approximates the probability density
function of the high dimensional input data. The
learning rate and the neighborhood proceed by time
until convergence.
Figure2. SOM connection features
Each neuron is a network packet or connection
which has certain identities either qualitative or
quantitative such that (JP, Port. Flag, time, data, etc .).
These identities could be related or not related to
certain attack connection. We consider these identities
as concepts at the FCM . The FCM module calculates
the errors caused out of these concepts and the degree
of relevance to certain or measure error (attack). Thus,
later we can estimate how much these concepts related
to attacks. The main advantage here is to call attention
to how domain knowledge of neurons (network
packets) can contribute on tracing new attacks or find
path of on-going or existing attack.
Table I Factors rules and effect value
We pick neurons with less relation to clusters and
test its correlation to clusters. In other words, each
feature parameter of odd neurons is measured based on
a comparison criteria to detect interrelation between
neurons i.e. determine the attack detection. To
calculate the abnormality factor per packet we need to
estimate the effect value of each feature parameter. The
total degree of abnormality of odd neurons is
calculated according to the following factors .
,
Factor Factor Rule Effect(E)
t X E SAvailability OX~S 0.1
Where X : Comparison
s:set of features
tX=S j
OX :t::S;
0.1Similarity
Where S is a feature of set Sand
,
X is comparison
1
Occurrences log~-- 0.2~ p(x)
Where p(x) is x' s probability
The problem arose with neighboring neurons which
are out of clusters and didn't reflect exactly the severity
of attack-ness in network connections. That is because
a network attack may not happen at a single action such
that one massive attack may be start by seemingly
innocuous or by a small probe actions to take place [5] .
In SOM classification process per example in [4] a
genetic or clustering algorithm used at the certain
attack zone to classify each attack by class were as
suspicious neurons which near attack zone or out of
clusters are not analyzed and remain suspicious were
they might be benign. As one potential solution to this
problem in the hierarchal SOM [2], they consider the
potential of studying the domain knowledge of features
to be applied to the whole SOM concepts.
Here, we suggest an improvement to this process by
considering the domain knowledge of particular
neurons (odd neurons) . Thus, we use the FCM to
calculate the severity/relevance of odd concepts
(neurons) to attacks. Therefore, benign concepts can be
dropped or/and others can be addressed as a potential
risk of error caused out of the cluster.
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MaxF ; (x)
L F; (x)
XE s
Where:
x : Comparison.
Relevancy MaxF; (x) is the maximum 0.2
frequency of occurrences and
I F;(x)
XEs
is the total sample size (number of
trials)
P(x)P(y)
Independency Where p(x) is the x's 0.2
probability and p(y) is the
v's probability
Cov(Xt~)/ s, s,
1 .1
Is the covariance of X and
Correlation Y comparisons at time t 0.2
and the standard deviation
Now we can estimate the total degree of
abnormality per packet according the following rule:
II
Un(x) = IE;
;=1
Where
Un(x) : Abnormality per packet
E; : Effect value of packet
n : Total feature number of abnormality
Once the abnormalities per unclustered packets are
calculated, the low malicious packets are dropped or
ignored and the rest are considered as concepts in the
FCM. It now is important to measure the effect!
influence value among the suspicious concepts to
determine the path of the existing or ongoing attack. If
the effect value is zero then there is no relationship
among these concepts. Table2 show the total degree of
effect value and relations between neurons.
Table2. Effect and relation value trace
Normal 0
Slight 0.2
Low 0.4
Somehow 0.6
Much 0.8
High I
3.1 FCM Procedure
FCM are a soft computing modeling techniques
generated from the combination of fuzzy logic and
neural networks [16,17,24,25]. FCM consist of nodes
(concepts) and causal relations between the nodes
formed in a structured collection (graph). The structure
can be presented as an associative single layer neural
networks which work on unsupervised mode whose
neurons are assigned to concepts meanings and the
interconnection weights represent the relationship
among these concepts.
According to [18] in the FCM model, the
directional influences are presented as all-or-none
relationships i.e. FCM provide qualitative as oppose to
quantitative information about relationships. In this
work, the task of FCM is to determine the casual
relation between the suspicious or odd neurons noted
by the SOM to quantify the causal inference process.
By quantifying the causal inference process we can
determine the attack detection and the severity of odd
neurons as such neurons with low causal relations can
be dropped i.e. reduce the false alerts.
The following steps are the general FCM
procedure:
1. Define the number of odd neurons (concepts)
2. Calculate the abnormality per neuron
2.1 drop neuron if the abnormality is low
3. Call FCM initialization
4. Call FCM Simulation
The number of neurons includes all those
unidentified and attack neurons (SOM Alerts). At every
epoch we process 100 neurons from the data set, later
we pick the alert neurons and calculates the
abnormality per each and every neuron to drop the low
attack related and consider the rest as concepts for the
FCM framework.
FCM Initialization
Initializing the FCM includes the definition of the
FCM concepts and building the relations among these
concepts by building a global matrix which can be
calculated according to [16,24]. However, in order to
build that matrix we define the weight of odd neurons
according to the total effect factor Un(x) and the
grade of causality Wi; between the nodes C and c.
" 1 J
according to the following assumptions:
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FCM Simulation
Once the FCM constructed its important now to
measure the overall simulation of the system which
consists of s input states such that M= {s I , s2 ... s }
where s; E [0,1]. After n number of iterations the
output is M i.e. the predictions of the FCM model.
The simulation of FCM follows the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
If C '* c . and E .)O then w. ' = max{E'}I J IJ I) IJ
If C '* c . and E .(0 then W - = max{E'}1 J 1) 1) IJ
If C '* c . then E . = 0 and W. is zero
I } I} I}
Knowledge
Reduced
Alerts
I . Read from input state
2. Calculate the Effect factors
2.1 drop low effect factors
3. Until the system convergence
3.1 show the link of related factors
4. Experiment and Evaluation Description
SOM-FCM model is a defense-in-depth network
based intru sion detection scheme. The model utilizes
the domain knowledge of network data to analyze the
packet information. Based on the analysis given,
benign packets are dropped and high risk packets can
be highlighted or blocked using a causal knowledge
reason in FCM. The flowchart of the detection module
is illu strated in figure3.
A. Data Collection and Preprocessing
In this experiment, we use the most popular IDS
evaluation data in which most of researchers aware of
and use for evaluating their research, the KDD Cup
1999 intrusion detection contest data [19] followed by
the success of the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation program by MIT Lincoln Labs (MIT
Lincoln Laboratory) [20].
The aim of DARPA evaluation was to assess the
current state of Intrusion Detection Systems at the
Department of Defense at the U.S. by simulating a
typical U.S. Force LAN . However, Lincoln Lab s
acquired 9 weeks of raw data collection for the
evaluation. The collected raw data processed into
connection records, about 5 million of record
connection. The data set contain 41 attributes for each
connection record plus one class label and 24 attack
types which fall into four main attack categories [21] as
follows:
Figure3. Flowchart of the detection module
I. Probing: surveillance attack categories
2. DoS: denial of service
3. R2L: unauthorized access from a remote
mach ine
4. U2R: unauthorized access to local super user
(root) privileges
The data set was established to evaluate the false
alarm rate and the detection rate using the available set
of known and unknown attacks embedded in the data
set [22]. We select a subset for testing our experiment.
The selected subset contain 2020 records with non zero
values as shown in table3 below because some attacks
are represented with few examples and the attack
distribution in the large data set is unbalanced.
However, collection, preprocessing and calculation of
false and true alert of test data are followed as in [5].
We implement and run our experiment on a system
with 2.667GHz Pentium4 processor 506 and 256MB
PC3200 DDR400 RAM running widows XP .
Table3 Selected data set records
Attack Attack Name # Records TotalCategory
Normal 1020 1020
DoS Neptune 105
DoS Smurf 124
DoS Back 42 367
DoS Land 40
DoS Pod 33
DoS Te ardrop 23
Probe lpsweep 79 319
Probe Nmap 59
Probe Portsweep 77
Probe Satan 44
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Probe Mscan 36
Probe Saint 24
U2R buffer overflow 82
U2R sqlattack 79
U2R Perl 8 217
U2R Xterm 22
U2R Rootkit 26
R2L guess _passwd 41
R2L Imap 2
R2L ftp write 22 97
R2L Phf 20
R2L Sendmail 12
TN: the total number of normal records
TA: the total number of attack records
Detection Rate =[(TA-FN) / TA] *IOO
False Alarm Rate =[FPITN]* 100
The primarily results show th~t it'~ possible . to
reduce false alerts in SOM-based intrusion .detectlOn
sensors using FCM causal reason. We believe that,
further improvement on the SOM structure with FCM
will improve the detection accuracy and expose more
information about the attack details. Table4. and table5
shows the experimental results obtained.
Table5. Fa se a arm companson
Method Detection Rate False Alarm Rate
SOM 88.30% 11.66%
SOM-FCM 90% 10.29%
t I esultsbl 4 ETa e . xpenmen a r
# # Detection RecordsAttack
SOM-Type Records SOM FCM
Normal 1020 101 8 lOIS
Probe 319 276 282
DoS 367 352 361
U2R 217 183 183
R2L 97 72 69
Overall 2020 1901 1910
6. Conclusion
C. Alert Collection
Alert collection part is the SOM output part of odd
neuron s. Each alert contain detail information about the
alert type, data and time happened. The collected alerts
attributes are then transformed as an input for the FCM
framework. Alerts attributes such as alert ID, date,
time, srel P, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort . . .
B. SOM Clustering
In SOM clustering module the selected data set
clustered based on the BMU and neighborhood
accommodation as explained in section3. SOM have
presented a homogeneous clusters which represent
normal data and odd neurons which represent alerts of
certain attack type or suspicious node s.
D. FCM Framework
In this module the received alert s attributes will be
carried for fine-tuning in the FCM framework as
discussed in section 3 and 3.1. In this module, neurons
which represent low effect or less correlated to other
attack like neurons are dropped or ignored and the high
suspicious nodes are highlighted.
5. Discussion
This paper shows the po ssibility of establishing link
between SOM, FCM and using the combination for
building better IDS. The immediate result of thi s
research is to improve the detection deficiency issue in
the SOM-based IDS sensor by reducing the false alerts
and increasing the detection accuracy at the sensor
level. For future work, experiment should be done on
real time traffic data and investigating methods for
proper feature selection and presentation.
In our experiment, the performance measure of both
SOM and combined SOM-FCM are carried out solely
on the selected data subset from the corrected.gz file of
the KDD'99 data set [19] which contains test data with
corrected labels. For instance, we calculate the
dete ction rate and the false alarm rate according to [5]
the following assumptions:
FP: the total number of normal records that are
classified as anomalous
FN: the total number of anomalous records that are
cla ssified as normal
7. References
[1J M. Amini, R. Jalili, and H.R. Shahriari, "RT-UNNID: A
practical solution to real-time network-based intrusion
detection using unsupervised neural networks", Computers &
Security, 25(2006) 459-468.
[2J H. Gunes Kayacik, A.N. Zincir-Heywood, and M.1.
Heywood, "A hierarchal SOM-based intru sion detection
system", Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence ,
2006, doi: 10.1016/j.engappai.2006.09.005
[3J W. Wang, X. Guan, X. Zhang , and L. Yang, "Profiling
program behavior for anomaly intrusion detection based on
the transition and frequency property of computer audit
data", Computers & Security, 25(2006) 539-550.
126
Authorized licensed use lim~ed to: UNIVERsrn SAINS MALAYSIA. Downloaded on April 29. 2009 at 15:55 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
[4] L. DeLooze, "Attack Characteri zat ion and Intrusi on
Detection using an Ensemble of Self-Organizing Map s",
Proceeding of the 2006 IEEE workshop on Information
Assurance, United States Military Academy, West Point,
NY, 2006 .
[5] S.T. Sarasarnma, Q.A. Zhu , and J. Huff, "Hierarchal
Kohonenen Net for Anomaly Detection in Network
Security", IEEE Transactions on Systems , Man, and
Cybernetics-Part B: Cybernetics, 35(2), 2005, pp. 302-312.
[6] K. Timm , "Strategies to Reduce False Positi ves and False
Negatives in NIOS", Securityliocus Article, 2001
www. securityfocus.com/infocusI1463 ( 10 Dec. 2007 ).
[7] MJ. Ranum, "False Positives: A User' s Guide to Making
Sen se of IDS Alarms", ICSA Labs IOSC, 2003.
[8] M. Nort on and D. Roelker , "Snort 2.0 Rule Opt imizer".
Sourcefire Network Security White Paper, April 2004.
[9] 'TIAA: A Toolkit for Intru sion Alert Analysis (Version
0.4)" , http :/discovery.csc.nc su.edu/software/correlator/verOA
[10] N.A. Bakar, B. Belaton and A. Sarnsud in, "False
Positive Redu ction via Intru sion Alert Quality Framework".
I f " IEEE international Confe rence on Netwo rks, Kuala
Lampur, Malaysia, Vol. I, 2005 , pp . 547-552.
[II] W. Lee, SJ . Stolfo, and K.W. Mok, "Adaptive intrusion
dete ction: A data mining approach", Artificial Intelligence
Review 14(6),2000, pp . 533- 567.
[12] A. Siraj , R.B. Vaughn, and S.M. Bridges, "Intrusio n
Sen sor Data Fusion in an intelligent Intru sion Detection
System Archit ecture" , Proceeding of the 37''' Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences, 2004 .
[13] J.E. Dickerson, J. Juslin, O. Koukousoula, and J.A.
Dickerson , "Fuzzy intru sion dete ction", IFSA World
Congress and 20th North Am erican Fuzzy Information
Processing Society (NA FlPS) International Confe rence.
Van cou ver, Briti sh Columbia, 200 1.
[14] Y. Liu , D. Tian, and A. Wang, "ANNIOS: Intru sion
Dete ction System Based on Artifi cial Neural Network".
Proceedings of the second international confere nce on
machine learning and cybernetics. Xi' an, 2003 .
[15] R. Alshammari, S. Sonamthiang, M. Teim ouri , D.
Riord an, "Using Neuro-fuzzy Approach to Reduce False
Positive Alerts". Fifth Annual Conference on
Communication Networks and Services Research
(CNSR '07), IEEE Computer Soc iety Pre ss, 2007, pp. 345-
349.
[16] B. Kosko, "Fuzzy Cognitive Map s", International
Journal ofMan-Ma chine Stud ies. Vol. 24, 1986, pp. 65-75 ,
[17] C.D. Stylios and P.P . Groumpos, "M athematical
Formulation of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps", Proceedings of the
7''' Mediterran ean Conference on Control and Automation
(MED99J, Haifa , Israel , 1999.
[18] J. Aguilar, "A Dynamic Fuzzy-Cognitive-M ap
Approach Based on Random Neural Networks",
International Journal of Computational Cognition, Vol. I ,
number 4, 2003, pp. 9 1- 107.
[19] KDD Cup 1999 Data . Knowledge Disco very in
Databa ses DARPA Archi ve.
http ://kdd.ics.uci.edU/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99 .html.
Accessed December 2007.
127
[20] MIT Lincoln Lab, DARPA Intru sion Detection
Evaluation Plan.
http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/ideval/d ata/ 200012000_data_ inde x
.html, Accessed December 2007.
[21] S. Pedd abachigari . A. Abraham. C. Grosan, and 1.
Thomas, "Mode ling Intru sion Detect ion System Using
Hybrid Intelligent Systems", Journal of Network and
Computer Applications, 2005 .
[22] K. Kendall , "A Database of Computer Attacks for the
Evaluation of Intru sion Detecti on Systems" . Master' s thesis.
Massachu setts Institute of Technology. Department of
Electrical Engineerin g and Computer Science, Cambridge.
MA,1 999.
[23] T. Kohon en , Self- Organizin g Maps, Third cd. Springer.
Berlin, 2000.
[24] B. Kosko, Fuzzy Engineering, Prent ice-Hall , New
Jersey, 1997.
[25 ] R. Axelrod, Structure of Decision : The Cogn itive Maps
of the Polit ical Elites, Princeton University Press, New
Jersey, 1976 .
Authorized licensed use limited \0 : UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYS IA. Downloaded on April 29, 2009 at 15:55 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
